Key Standards to Preserve Under an Integration of the World Bank Group’s Accountability Mechanisms

This year, the World Bank Group (WBG) launched an initiative to integrate the environmental and social (E&S) risk management and accountability mechanisms of its private and public sector lending arms. We support improving the Bank’s E&S coordination across its operations. In particular, there is a critical need for the Bank’s private sector lending to learn lessons from its public sector operations. However, any integration of policies and operations, including the accountability mechanisms, should result in the WBG adopting the highest standard. 

As the Bank explores options for merging its public and private sector accountability mechanisms, the Inspection Panel and the Compliance Advisor Ombudsman (CAO), respectively, it’s crucial that the WBG centers the rights and needs of affected communities. If well executed, merging the Inspection Panel and CAO could simplify and improve communities’ access to accountability. However, there is a risk of backsliding if the integration occurs within a compressed timeline and without broad stakeholder input. We are concerned that the Bank’s process for reviewing options to merge the Inspection Panel and CAO has lacked transparency and engagement with civil society and communities. The Bank has yet to make a public announcement about these plans, hold formal consultations with stakeholders, or disclose proposed procedures for the new accountability mechanism. There is still time for the Bank to develop a consultative and thorough process that yields the best possible outcome for communities. 

Further, while neither mechanism is perfect, both the Inspection Panel and CAO have unique strengths that the Bank should preserve under an integration. For this integration to be successful, it is essential that the outcome strengthens access to remedy and institutional learning. Under any proposed plan to reform or combine mechanisms, we encourage the Bank to maintain the following standards:

1. General eligibility criteria: CAO has simple, clear eligibility criteria, which reduces the burden on complainants and creates a more equitable process. Communities and civil society organizations unfamiliar with filing complaints on multilateral development bank (MDB) projects are more likely to understand CAO’s eligibility criteria. CAO’s primary requirement for an eligible complaint is a description of “how the Complainant believes they have been, or may be, harmed by the Project or Sub-Project.” By contrast, complaints to the Inspection Panel must meet a higher threshold, including prior attempted contact with management and a detailed description of harm that is the result of “a serious violation by the Bank of its policies and procedures.” CAO’s simple eligibility requirements allow the mechanism to receive complaints from affected communities more easily. Further, CAO’s eligibility criteria enables the mechanism to more easily accept complaints on projects financed through a broader range of financial products. Under an integration of CAO and the Inspection Panel, we urge the WBG to adopt the CAO’s eligibility standards at a minimum. 
2. Timeline for eligibility: By contrast, the Inspection Panel has more lenient policies around when complainants can file complaints. The Inspection Panel allows complainants to file complaints when a project is under consideration, but before it is approved by the Board. The Panel also allows complaints filed without management approval for up to fifteen months after the closure of a project. Allowing complaints filed before Board approval not only improves communities’ access to accountability, but also provides Bank management an opportunity to change the design of a project before implementation, preventing future harm and reducing costs. In the event of a merger of accountability mechanisms, we encourage the WBG to adopt the Inspection Panel’s timeline for eligibility.
3. Independent monitoring: CAO has a strong monitoring mandate, which allows it to track the International Finance Corporation (IFC) and/or Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency’s (MIGA) implementation of Management Action Plans (MAP) that detail the corrective actions the Bank and client are supposed to take as a result of a CAO compliance investigation. Independent monitoring of remedial actions is crucial for communities to receive all aspects of remedy on a reasonable timeline. However, the Inspection Panel’s current verification mandate is significantly weaker than that of CAOs or other independent accountability mechanisms (IAMs). While the Panel is allowed to request Board approval for “independent risk-based proportionate verification of the implementation of the MAPs approved after September 8, 2020,” these measures are still not effective because it means monitoring happens only in select cases. Under a merger of accountability mechanisms, we encourage the WBG to adopt CAO’s monitoring mandate, allowing for independent verification of the WBG's and client’s implementation of remedial actions across private and public lending.
4. Remedial action recommendations: CAO also has the ability to make recommendations for remedial actions and/or steps needed to prevent future non-compliance in its compliance investigation report. After extensive engagement with the complainants and project-affected communities, CAO is well placed to understand what corrective actions are needed to address the harm caused by an IFC or MIGA project. The Inspection Panel lacks this ability, which is a gap in the Panel’s compliance investigation reports. We call on the WBG to preserve the CAO standard under a potential merger of mechanisms. 
5. Compliance investigations: CAO has the authority to self-initiate compliance investigations under certain circumstances, including when there are E&S compliance issues of systemic importance, potential severe harm, or when project-affected people cannot file a complaint due to fear of reprisals. This component of CAO’s policy allows for a more proactive approach to accountability. In several cases, including the recent Bridge Academies investigation, we have seen that allowing for self-initiation of compliance investigations supports communities, highlights gaps in E&S policies, and reveals institutional issues with implementation and project selection. Self-initiation also allows CAO to investigate harms in contexts where potential complainants fear raising concerns because of civic space restrictions. The Inspection Panel cannot self-initiate compliance investigations, which is a significant gap in its policy. Under a merger of mechanisms, we urge the WBG to match the CAO policy at a minimum. 

Any change to or integration of the CAO and Inspection Panel must meet the highest standards and preserve the ability of communities to access accountability when harmed by WBG projects. A failure to maintain any of the above provisions should be considered dilution or regression in the accountability policies.